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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980108-CA 
v. : 
MARCO C. FANARI, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998), in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah, the Honorable David L. 
Mower, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should this Court consider challenges to findings of fact that were not presented 
to the trial court? A defendant who fails to object at trial or request appropriate findings 
waives the objection on appeal. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant, whose motion to suppress had been denied, waived any objection to 
admissibility of the child victim's out-of-court statements because he did not request the 
findings dictated by the statute and because he made no objection at trial). With respect to 
those challenges to findings of fact that were preserved, "[the appellate court] review[s] a 
trial court's factual findings underlying the decision to suppress evidence under the 
'clearly erroneous' standard." State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). "[The appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's fact-finding role and 
reverse[s] those factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that the stop of defendant's vehicle was lawfully 
stopped for a traffic violation and possible driver impairment? "In absence of clear error, 
the trial court's findings of fact underlying its decision to grant or deny the suppression 
motion must be upheld." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted), affd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). "However, as for the trial court's 
legal conclusions in regards thereto, the correction of error standard applies." IdL 
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant was properly detained upon 
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal conduct? A trial court's determination of 
whether an investigative detention was supported by reasonable suspicion is a conclusion 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). The 
trial court's ruling should not, however, be subjected to "a close de novo review." Id. 
Rather, some deference is accorded the trial court because the reasonable suspicion 
standard itself "conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge[s]" so that they can 
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"grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion 
determination." Id. at 939-40. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1) (1993) 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the 
following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a single 
lane and may not be moved from the lane until the operator has determined 
the movement can be made safely. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Marco C. Fanari, was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) (R. 8-
9). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence gathered in a search alleged to 
violate the United States and Utah Constitutions (R. 22-23). The trial court denied the 
motion (R. 53-54, 59-62). Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty as charged, reserving for 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 71-75). The trial court sentenced defendant 
to a statutory one-to-fifteen year term in the Utah State Prison, and defendant timely 
appealed (R. 78-81). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On April 3, 1996, defendant was alone, driving his rented Lincoln car eastward on 
highway 1-70 (R. 1; Tr. 4-5). At the time Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Dennis Avery 
observed defendant's car, it was right behind a semi-trailer truck (Tr. 6). Trooper Avery 
explained that in that desolate, outlying area most of the accidents he observed were one 
car roll-overs, in which "[the drivers] get locked into the vehicle in front of them, they get 
tired, [sic] I stop a lot of cars for that" (R. 6). Defendant "was going from the fog line, 
which is the right-hand lane, into the center [of the two-lane road] and then back (Tr. 4-7). 
Trooper Avery observed defendant's driving pattern, even as he drove right behind 
defendant's car, noting that "[i]t would hit the white fog line, then it would hit the center 
line, and then it would-it would come back in his lane, then he'd drift over again (Tr. 8). 
In this manner defendant repeatedly failed to remain within the lane in which he was 
traveling, weaving from the fog line to the center line (Tr. 7, 9). At no time did defendant 
attempt to pass the truck in front of him (Tr. 8). The highway was a straight stretch of 
roadway (Tr. 8). Trooper Avery followed defendant for about three-quarters of a mile, or 
twenty to thirty seconds (Tr. 8). The day was sunny and somewhat windy: "[T]here's 
always some type of breeze" (Tr. 11). 
1
 The motion to suppress was based on the testimony of the arresting officer 
presented at the preliminary hearing and determined on the basis of written memoranda 
only, without further hearing or oral argument (R. 53; Tr. 38). 
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Trooper Avery pulled defendant over, walked to the driver's side of the car and 
informed defendant that he had stopped him for going back and forth from the fog line to 
the center line (Tr. 12). Defendant said he thought he might have been weaving due to the 
wind (Tr. 12). Trooper Avery asked defendant for his license and, recognizing that the car 
was a rental car, the rental papers (Tr. 12). Defendant produced the documents and while 
he examined them, Trooper Avery asked defendant what brought him to Utah (Tr. 13). 
Defendant indicated that he had flown to Las Vegas to visit a friend (Tr. 13-14). At this 
point, Trooper Avery's attention was caught by defendant's unusual nervousness — 
defendant was shaking and avoided eye contact as Trooper Avery spoke to him (Tr. 14). 
Trooper Avery acknowledged that *;once in a while" people got nervous when they were 
pulled over by highway troopers, but there was a difference in defendant's nervousness in 
that he was shaking as he handed the officer the rental papers. In response to the officer's 
question, defendant said that he was going to return the car in Montrose, Colorado (Tr. 15-
16). Trooper Avery stated that while his questioning concerning defendant's itinerary did 
not have anything to do with an investigation about improper lane change, he typically 
engaged in such inquiry to help determine if a detainee was being up front with him (Tr. 
16). Trooper Avery recognized defendant's inconsistency in telling him that defendant 
was intending to return the car in Montrose while the rental papers indicated that the car 
was to be returned in Las Vegas within two weeks (Tr. 17). Although Trooper Avery 
recognized that a rental car could be rented in one city and returned to another, he 
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regarded such conduct as unusual in his experience (Tr. 17-19). He also found unusual 
defendant's stating that he had just stayed around Las Vegas whereas, comparing the 
stated mileage on the rental papers with the car's current odometer reading, defendant had 
driven over 1,100 miles in just the few preceding days (Tr. 19). Trooper Avery's inquiries 
lasted about a minute or two (Tr. 20). 
At the end of these inquiries, Trooper Avery called in for a warrants check (Tr. 21). 
At this point, Sergeant Lance Bushnell, who had just completed a separate stop across the 
highway, turned through the median and pulled up behind Trooper Avery's patrol car (Tr. 
21). The report back from dispatch was negative for outstanding warrants, although 
defendant did have a record in New Jersey (Tr. 21-22). Trooper Avery asked Sergeant 
Bushnell, whom he recognized as a drug recognition expert, to talk with defendant and see 
if he might be on any type of drug (Tr. 22). At this point, according to Trooper Avery, 
defendant had been stopped about five minutes (Tr. 22). Sergeant Bushnell administered 
the lack of convergence eye test on defendant and, apparently without performing any 
other tests, put defendant in his patrol car where he continued to talk to defendant (Tr. 23-
24).2 Defendant was not free to go at this point (Tr. 24). Trooper Avery then asked 
2
 The convergence eye test was similar to the gaze nystagmus test, in which a 
subject is asked to follow with his eyes a pen as it is moved repeatedly in circles. The 
subject's nose is then touched in an attempt to make the eyes go cross-eyed, i.e., 
converge, and if one eye "float[s] away, the lack of convergence signifies marijuana use 
(Tr. 23). 
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defendant if he had ever been in trouble before, and defendant responded that he had been 
arrested "for marijuana'' in New Jersey (Tr. 24). When the trooper asked defendant if he 
had any illegal drugs in the car, defendant, very nervously and avoiding eye contact, said 
there were no drugs in the car (Tr. 24). When Trooper Avery asked if he could look in the 
car, defendant refused (Tr. 25). Defendant also refused to allow Trooper Avery to look in 
the trunk, stating that it contained only his clothing bag in which he hung his suits and 
shirts (Tr. 25). When Trooper Avery pointed out that defendant's suits and shirts were 
hanging in the rear of the car, defendant claimed he had not put those in the bag (Tr. 25). 
Trooper Avery also observed a couple of air fresheners in the back seat (Tr. 27). 
Based on his experience on his observations of defendant, to wit: "I've seen 
enough of it that I felt pretty confident it was drugs," defendant's responses about the car 
rental and mileage, and the presence of air fresheners, Trooper Avery felt he had 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs (Tr. 25-26).3 When Trooper 
Avery informed defendant that he was calling for the drug dog, defendant calmly 
responded, "That's fine" (Tr. 28). Trooper Avery still had defendant's papers, and so 
defendant was not then free to leave (Tr. 28). The drug dog arrived in fifteen minutes (Tr. 
29). At this point defendant had been detained about thirty minutes (Tr. 29). The drug 
dog "hit" on the trunk of defendant's car (R. 32). A search uncovered two hundred fifty-
3
 When the car was eventually searched, police also found three or four air 
fresheners hanging in the trunk (Tr. 26). 
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five pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the car and $1,000 from a briefcase found on the 
front seat (Tr. 5, 28, 32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact are for the most part 
unpreserved or constitute invited error. Where defendant has properly preserved his 
claims, the record does not show that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, with 
the exception of one finding which does not affect the outcome of the case. 
POINT II 
The trooper was constitutionally justified in stopping defendant's car because he 
observed defendant continually weave across the fog line, a violation of the traffic code. 
Cases defendant relies on, which did not find reasonable suspicion, are distinguishable on 
the patterns of driving described, which were consistently less deviant and which in a 
couple of notable cases consisted of only a single incident of weaving. Additionally, 
defendant fails to challenge the trial court's alternative conclusion that, based on the 
weaving pattern of driving, the stop was also supported by reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was impaired, thus waiving any challenge to the validity of the initial stop. In 
any case, it is well established that in circumstances such as in this case, an officer's 
observation of a driver's repeated weaving gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
impairment. 
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POINT III 
The trooper was constitutionally justified in expanding the scope of his inquiry to 
include investigation of defendant's possible drug transport. The trooper made 
preliminary inquiries which established defendant's possible drug impairment, all 
accomplished within a few minutes. Once it was established that defendant was under the 
influence of drugs, and given his nervous and evasive behavior, the inconsistencies in his 
stated travel, and his prior criminal record, it was reasonable for the trooper to believe that 
defendant might have been in possession of drugs and to continue to detain defendant for 
further investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE VARIOUSLY UNPRESERVED, 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, OR INVITED ERROR. 
Defendant claims on appeal that four of the trial court's findings of fact in support 
of its denial of his motion to suppress are erroneous.4 However, with the exception of his 
challenges to the findings of his recent drug use and his weaving while driving, defendant 
4
 Specifically, defendant claims that there is no record evidence to support the trial 
court's findings that (1) defendant acknowledged he had been weaving, (2) defendant 
could not remember which airline he took to Las Vegas, (3) that Sergeant Bushnell 
advised that defendant demonstrated indications of recent drug use, and (4) the narcotics 
detection dog alerted on the trunk of defendant's car. App. Br. at 7-8. 
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failed to preserve his objections for appeal. Additionally, defendant's challenge to the 
finding that the narcotics dog alerted on the trunk of his car constitutes invited error. 
Finally, with the exception of his challenge to the finding of his failure to remember the 
airline he used, his claim that the findings are clearly erroneous is not supported by the 
record. 
A. Defendant Failed to Preserve His 
Challenges to Findings No. 6 and No, 8. 
In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that Trooper Avery lacked a reasonable 
basis to stop his car for a traffic violation based on his driving pattern, and, thereafter, to 
continue the detention based, in part, on Sergeant Bushneil's observations of his drug use 
(R. 30-32). In response to the trial court's instruction following its denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress (Order on Motion to Suppress, R. 53-54), the prosecutor prepared 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order, R. 59-62, attached at Addendum A). Defendant objected to finding #1 (Findings, 
R. 60, par. 1), claiming that the trial court's finding that *wthe vehicle was going across the 
fog line and then back across" was "unclear" (Defendant's Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 56), and to finding #7 (Findings, R. 61), 
claiming that there was no additional record evidence to support Sergeant Bushnell's 
determination that defendant was impaired (R. 57). Thus, defendant fully preserved those 
challenges to the trial court's findings for appeal. 
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However, at no point, either in his motion to suppress or in his objections to the 
findings, did defendant preserve the two additional challenges to the trial court's findings 
now made on appeal, namely that defendant did not remember which airline he took to Las 
Vegas and that the dog alerted on the trunk of his car. App. Br. at 7-8. Further, defendant 
nowhere asserts that these two challenges to fact findings are preserved. Finally, the trial 
court overruled defendant's objections to its findings of fact as untimely (see Order on 
Defendant's Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 63), a 
ruling defendant has not challenged on appeal. Thus, defendant has failed to preserve for 
appeal challenges to those two findings of fact. See Fitzgerald v. Corbett 793 P.2d 356, 
361 (Utah 1990) (citing with approval O.S. Staplev Co. v. Logan. 431 P.2d 910, 912 
(1967) (where the trial court substantially complied with making specific findings and 
conclusions of law and plaintiff did not timely object or move to amend or make 
additional findings, plaintiff could not raise on appeal the objection that the trial court 
erred)); State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989) (defendant, whose motion to 
suppress had been denied, waived any objection to admissibility of the child victim's 
out-of-court statements because he did not request the findings dictated by the statute and 
because he made no objection at trial). 
B. Defendant's Challenge to the Finding No, 8, that the 
Narcotics Dog Alerted on the Trunk of His Car, is Invited Error, 
Defendant challenges the trial court's finding no. 8, stating that "[a] narcotics dog 
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was called to the scene and immediately alerted on the trunk area of the vehicle" 
(Findings, R. 60). In the circumstances of this case, this claim constitutes invited error. 
'The doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and 
then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting State v. Henderson. 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)). In this case, 
defendant stated in the fact statement of his motion to suppress, "[t]he dog hit on the 
trunk, and a search of the trunk revealed illegal drugs" (R. 32). Having affirmed that fact 
in his motion to suppress, defendant cannot now argue that "there is no record evidence 
that a narcotics detection dog ever alerted on the trunk of the Lincoln" App. Br. 8.5 
C. Defendant's Challenges to Findings No. 3 and No. 7, 
Which Are Preserved, Are Unsupported by the Record. 
"[The appellate court] review[s] a trial court's factual findings underlying the 
decision to suppress evidence under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." State v. Castner. 
825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). "[The appellate court] defer[s] to 
the trial court's fact-finding role and reverse[s] those factual findings only if they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence." Id (citation omitted). 
Driving Pattern - The trial found that "[w]hile the documents were being located, 
5
 The State acknowledges that Trooper Avery did not testify during the 
preliminary hearing that the narcotics dog alerted on the trunk of the car. However, it is 
evident from the parties' respective motions that, following discovery and the preliminary 
hearing, both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed w ith the trial court's finding 
concerning the dog's reactions (R. 32, 46). 
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Trooper Avery told the defendant why he had been stopped and the defendant 
acknowledged he had been weaving; however, he attributed the weaving to the wind" 
(Finding no. 3, R. 60). 
Defendant claims that the record does not support this finding because the trooper's 
testimony was "more equivocal" on this point, namely, that Trooper Avery testified that 
defendant "said something about he thought he might have been weaving because of the 
wind." App. Br. at 7 (quoting Tr. 12). 
It is well established the trial court is in a unique position to determine the facts 
because of its ability to observe the demeanor of the witness. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 
853, 865 (Utah 1996) ("Long history has taught the judiciary that the forum which hears 
conflicting evidence has a superior capability to resolve factual questions, particularly 
where witness demeanor is concerned."); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) 
("The [trial court judge] is therefore considered to be in the best position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an 
appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record."); Kartchner v. Home, 1 Utah 
2d 112, 115, 262 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1953) (recognizing that the trial court, being able to 
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, was in a much better position than the appellate 
court "to determine the intended meaning of their words"). 
In this case, observing Trooper Avery testify, the trial court could reasonably have 
found that the trooper was essentially communicating precisely what the court found, 
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namely that defendant had indeed admitted to the trooper that he had been weaving, albeit 
as a result of the wind. Indeed, defendant's disclaimer that his driving pattern was a result 
of the wind would seem to confirm his admission of weaving. The trial court's findings 
on this point cannot be regarded as clearly erroneous. 
Signs of Impairment - The trial court found that "Sgt. Lance Bushnell, a drug 
recognition expert, came to the scene and advised that the defendant demonstrated 
indications of recent drug use" (Finding no. 7, R. 60). 
Defendant claims that this finding is unsupported by any "reliable" record evidence, 
arguing that although Sergeant Bushnell told Trooper Avery that defendant "demonstrated 
a lack of convergence of the eyes, there was no evidence of other tests being given, 
defendant was not charged with DUI, and the officers' actions did not indicate that they 
were concerned about defendant's impairment." App. Br. at 7-8. 
As defendant noted in his statement of facts, see App. Br. at 5, Trooper Avery 
testified that lack of convergence is an indicator of drug use (R. 23). The trooper 
described the lack of convergence test, compared it to the gaze nystagmus test, and 
specifically testified that if one eye appeared to float away that lack of convergence 
indicated impairment due to marijuana (R. 23). According to Trooper Avery, Sergeant 
Bushnell also talked to defendant (R. 23). Thus, although Trooper Avery could not recall 
that other field sobriety tests were given, it is apparent that the record does support the trial 
court's finding that the officer found physical evidence of recent drug use. As such, it is 
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not clearly erroneous.1 
POINT II 
THE TROOPER WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFIED IN 
STOPPING DEFENDANT'S CAR INCIDENT TO A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION COMMITTED IN HIS PRESENCE, OR BECAUSE 
THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS IMPAIRED. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's conclusion that the initial stop was justified 
as a result of a traffic violation committed in Trooper Avery's presence and because the 
officer reasonably suspected that defendant might have been impaired. In support, he 
cites various authorities whose factual scenarios contain somewhat similar descriptions of 
his driving pattern. Defendant's argument, however, is unpersuasive, not only because he 
has read the record in an untenably biased manner, but also because the cases he cites in 
support are distinguishable on their facts. 
"[A]n officer is 'constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence.'"" State v. Matison. 
875 P.2d 584, 586-87 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 
6
 As argued above, defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding regarding his 
failure to recall the airline he used in getting to Las Vegas (see Finding no. 6, R. 60) was 
not preserved for appeal and is not the basis for a plain error argument on appeal. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to preserve a challenge to this finding, the State 
concedes that this it is without record support and is clearly erroneous. However, as 
argued later in this brief, Trooper Avery had sufficient reasonable suspicion based on 
other facts to continue to detain defendant until the arrival of the drug recognition dog. 
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(Utah 1994), quoting State v. Talbot 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990)). "A stop is 
also Justified when the officer has "reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol " '" Id. 
(quoting Lopez, 873 P.2dat 1132, quoting State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 
App. 1992)). 
In Talbot, the court stated that "a stop is lawful if incident to a traffic violation 
committed in the officers' presence." Talbot. 792 P.2d at 491 (citing State v. Marshall. 
791 P.2d 880, 881-83 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 
1988)); see also Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132. "An observed traffic violation gives the officer 
'at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic offense."' Id. 
(quoting State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.2 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. 
Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995). An officer may legally stop a vehicle 
whenever he suspects "that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable 
traffic and equipment regulations.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 
440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). This is because "police officers are under a duty to enforce the 
traffic laws." Id. at 1135; see Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 225 (finding officer justified in 
making an investigative stop for speeding and an equipment violation, i.e., a broken 
taillight). 
The trial court concluded that "[defendant's] vehicle was lawfully stopped for 
investigation related to the traffic offense of operating a vehicle outside the designated 
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lane of travel, Section 41-6-61(1), Utah Code Annotated, and possible driver impairment" 
(R.61).7 
Relating defendant's driving pattern and the surrounding circumstances, defendant 
states that he was traveling behind a tractor trailer in windy conditions and that Trooper 
Avery stopped his car because "he saw the Lincoln cross the fog line and move back to the 
center line." App. Br. at 9-10. This latter statement, in suggesting only a momentary, 
single lapse of driver control, does not fairly represent the true import of Trooper Avery's 
testimony. In fact, Trooper Avery observed defendant's weaving pattern on a straight 
section of freeway for twenty to thirty seconds during which time defendant drove his 
Lincoln sedan about three-quarters of a mile right behind a tractor trailer (Tr.4-6, 8). 
According to the trooper, during this period defendant repeatedly drove across the fog line 
and then back to the center: 
Q [Mr. Athay]: And this vehicle was staying within that lane of travel; 
correct? 
A [Trooper Avery]: He was going to the - to the fog line, then back across 
to the center line. 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1)( 1993), provides: 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes 
for traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely 
within a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until 
the operator has determined the movement can be made 
safely. 
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Q: Right. But it was staying within the lane of travel? 
A: No. It was going across the fog line, then back across to- to the center line. 
So, it was not staying right in that lane, no. 
Q: Okay. Did it ever leave the lane of travel--
A: Yes. 
Q: - that it should have been traveling in? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When did it do that? 
A: Well, as I observed it, when I was even behind it. It would hit the white 
fog line, then it would hit the center line, and then it would - it would come 
back in his lane, then he'd drift over again. 
(Tr. 7-8). 
It is plain from the trooper's testimony that defendant was continually unable to 
properly remain in the lane of travel. Defendant argues that operating his car within the 
strictures of the law was not "practical" because it was a windy day and he was traveling 
behind a tractor trailer. App. Br. at 10. For support, he first relies on State v. Bello, 871 
P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994). 
In BeUo, a driver was stopped because the car he was driving momentarily weaved 
out of its lane. Bello, 871 P.2d at 585. This Court held the traffic stop invalid because 
section 41-6-61(1) requires a driver to operate his vehicle within a single lane "as nearly as 
practical." Id. at 587. However, the driver in Bello was driving a truck with a camper 
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shell, a circumstance "that caused it to catch the wind more easily than other vehicles," in 
extremely windy conditions. Id. Further bolstering the Court's view was the officer's 
failure to observe any other deviations from a normal driving pattern while following the 
truck for more than two miles after first observing the truck drift across the lane markers. 
Id. Based on these facts, the Court found that "the single instance of weaving . . . could 
not constitute a violation of section 41-6-61(1) and therefore cannot serve as the 
constitutional basis for stopping Bello's truck." Id. 
Bello is distinguishable from this case in every particular this Court found 
significant in that case. First, unlike the conditions in Bello, which were "extremely" 
windy, it was only "somewhat" windy, or "breezy" at the time Trooper Avery observed 
defendant's driving pattern (R. 11). Second, the defendant in Bello was driving a camper, 
a high profile vehicle more easily subject to the force of the wind than the Lincoln sedan 
driven by defendant in this case (R. 1). Third, unlike the defendant in Bello, who had only 
a single instance of weaving, defendant in this case was continually weaving and unable to 
maintain travel within the lane throughout the twenty to thirty second period in which he 
was observed (R. 7-8). Finally, unlike the officer's observation in Bello, there was no 
point in Trooper Avery's three-quarter of a mile observation of defendant in which 
defendant was not weaving (R. 7-8). 
The only additional factor in this case was that defendant was traveling "right 
behind" a tractor trailer (R. 6). There is no evidence about how far defendant was behind 
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the trailer or what effect the trailer would have had on defendant's car. In any case, this 
fact avails defendant nothing, for even if it were shown defendant's car was being tossed 
about because it was close to the trailer, that was a circumstance clearly within defendant's 
"practical" control by either increasing the distance between the vehicles or passing the 
trailer. Trooper Avery testified that defendant never attempted to pass the trailer (R. 8). 
More importantly, defendant's closely following the trailer was, in itself, a basis for 
reasonable suspicion of impairment, since it suggested to the Trooper Avery that the driver 
of the car was tired and posed a genuine danger to himself and others: "A lot of times, out 
here in this outlying area, it's such a desolate area, most of our accidents are one car roll-
overs, they get locked into the vehicle in front of them, they get tired, I stop a lot of cars 
for that" (R. 6).8 
Defendant also relies on United States v. Lyons. 7 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1993). Lyons 
8
 Defendant also relies on United States v. Gregory. 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996), 
which cites Bello with approval based on facts similar to those in BeUo, to wit: 
defendant's car crossed into the right shoulder once on winding mountainous terrain in 
windy conditions. Gregory, 79 F.3d at 979. The court found that the single, isolated 
incident was not a violation of section 41-6-61(1), nor did it give rise to reasonable 
suspicion of impairment due to sleepiness or intoxication, where the officer did not intend 
to stop the defendant to conduct a DUI investigation and, in fact, did not conduct any 
field sobriety tests, and did not testify to any facts that would suggest a reasonable 
concern for public safety. kL Thus, Gregory is similarly distinguishable for the same 
reason reasons as is Bello. Closer to the facts of this case is United States v. Botero-
Ospina. 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), upholding the validity of a traffic stop 
and a subsequent search uncovering seventy-four kilograms of cocaine, where the officer 
observed the defendant "swerve from the outside lane, straddle the center line, and 
swerve back to the outside lance." id. at 785, 788. 
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is immediately distinguishable as a pretext stop case. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 
(rejecting the pretext stop doctrine in which the court indulges in a consideration of the 
officer's "motivations or suspicions" in analyzing the reasonableness of a automobile 
stop). In analyzing the validity of the stop in Lyons, the court focused on the officer's 
"sixth sense," his admissions that it was "not unusual" for driver's to avoid eye contact 
with a police officer or to drive without some weaving, and the officer's uncorroborated 
subjective belief that the defendant was impaired because the driver refused to make eye 
contact with him. Lyons, 7 F.3d at 975. In fact, the defendant's car in Lyons weaved 
three or four times "within its lane" during the two miles it was observed, see kL at 974, 
thus distinguishing Lyons from this case not only as to objective facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion of impairment, but also as to any basis for an observed traffic 
violation. Indeed, the officer in Lyons, unlike Trooper Avery in this case, admitted that 
the "defendant's 'weaving' violated no Utah law." Id. at 975. 
Finally, the trial court also concluded that defendant's weaving gave rise to 
reasonable suspicion of "possible driver impairment" justifying the stop (R. 61), a 
conclusion defendant has not challenged on appeal, see App. Br. at 8-13, thus waiving the 
issue of whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop based on impairment. State v. 
Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding and refusing to review first 
degree murder conviction based on alternative ground for jury's verdict not challenged on 
appeal), dismissal of habeas corpus aff d. 945 P.2d 673 (1997). In any case, it is well 
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established that in circumstances distinguishable from those in BeHo, an officer's 
observation of a driver's weaving gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment.9 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that Trooper Avery observed defendant 
commit a violation of the Utah Traffic Code, and further, that the trooper's observations 
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was impaired, both of which provided a 
legal basis for the stop. 
9
 Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a police officer's observation of a 
vehicle weaving across the road provides sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the 
vehicle. State v. Superior Court. 718 P.2d 171, 175 (Ariz. 1986) (holding weaving of vehicle 
within its own lane is a specific and articulable fact sufficient to justify an investigative stop); 
People v. Perez. 175 Cal. App.3d Supp. 8, 11, 221 Cal. Rptr. 776, 778 (Cal.Super. 1985) 
(holding officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle after observing "pronounced weaving" 
of vehicle in its own lane for a substantial distance); State v. Harrison. 618 A.2d 1381, 1384 
n.4 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding "the weaving of a vehicle in its own lane provides 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an investigative stop to determine if the 
driver is, in fact, intoxicated or impaired"), judgment aff d. 638 A. 2d 601 (Conn. 1994); 
State v. Atkinson. 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (holding vehicle swerving over 
center line twice in two blocks and veering back across lane to extreme right gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of driver's impairment); State v. Brown. 920 P.2d 460, 462 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1996) (holding observation of vehicle crossing left of center four times, driving off shoulder, and 
weaving within its own lane provides officer with reasonable suspicion); State v. Aubin. 397 
S.E.2d 653, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that observations of a car going 20 
miles an hour below the posted speed and weaving within its lane are sufficient to raise a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver is operating the vehicle while impaired), review 
denied. 402 S.E.2d 443 (N.C), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 842 (1991); State v. Dorendorf. 359 
N.W.2d 115, 117 (N.D.I984) (finding reasonable suspicion to stop where driving pattern 
was smooth continuous weaving within a lane of traffic); White v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. 
Safety. 606 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Okla. 1980) (holding officer had reasonable suspicion to stop 
vehicle after officer observed vehicle weave in roadway for approximately a block and a half, 
even though vehicle did not cross center line); State v. Sulser. 871 P.2d 126, 127 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding officer who observed vehicle cross center lane twice and then continue to weave 
in its own lane for another two blocks had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle). 
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POINT HI 
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TROOPER HAD 
A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE BASIS TO DETAIN 
DEFENDANT TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE DEFENDANT'S 
POSSIBLE IMPAIRMENT AND POSSIBLE DRUG TRANSPORT. 
Defendant argues that even if the initial stop was valid, Trooper Avery lacked a 
reasonable basis to suspect that he was carrying drugs based only on his nervousness, 
minor unexplained details concerning his car rental arrangements, and a brief, unspecific 
reference to his prior criminal history. In support, he cites the substantial body of Utah 
case law consistent with his position. App. Br. at 13-26. However, those cases are 
distinguishable in that they do not reflect a developing fact pattern which, as in this case, 
rapidly and incrementally increased the trooper's reasonable suspicion of defendant's 
criminal involvement as the detention continued. Particularly, defendant not only omits 
from his analysis, but even misrepresents, crucial evidence of his impairment due to 
marijuana, see App. Br. at 26-28, but which along with the arguably otherwise insufficient 
factors mentioned above, provided a reasonable basis for further inquiry. 
"'What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1131 (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 
S. Ct. 1868 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437 
(I960))). "In defining the scope of Fourth Amendment rights, 'there is "no ready test for 
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determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against 
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'"" Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 
1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. 
Municipal Ct.. 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967))). "In other words, 'the permissibility of a 
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'" 
State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1202 (Utah 1995) (quoting Prouse. 440 U.S. at 654), and 
applying a balancing test to the totality of the circumstances, "recognizing that a multitude 
of factors may influence an officer's discretion to arrest"). 
After reasonable suspicion has been established to justify a stop, a court then asks 
whether the resulting detention was "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1133 (quoting Terry. 392 
U.S. at 19-20). Once a stop is made, "the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Id (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 
U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). The length and scope of detention "must be 'strictly tied to and 
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation possible." IdL (quoting State v. 
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terrv. 392 U.S. at 19). The focus is not 
on the length of detention, "but on 'whether the police diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which 
time it was necessary to detain the defendant.'" Marshall. 791 P.2d at 884 (quoting United 
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States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)). "Investigative questioning that further 
detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity." Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132. 
Defendant argues that Trooper Avery's basis for further detaining him, to wit: that 
defendant was nervous, that his travel plans did seem completely sensible, and that 
defendant had a criminal record of uncertain dimensions, including an arrest "for 
marijuana,'' was composed of "innocuous" factors which Utah's appellate courts and the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had variously found inadequate to expand the scope of 
detention to investigate for drugs. App. Br. at 14-25. However, in analyzing these 
constituents of the trooper's concern, defendant typically views each component in 
isolation, without concern for the totality of the circumstances. Thus, for example, he cites 
United States v. Sandoval. 29 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that a 
defendant's criminal history does not constitute reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant 
to investigate for drugs, see App. Br. at 24-25, but fails to note that Sandoval's criminal 
history was the sole basis for continuing a detention following a routine stop for speeding 
that immediately resulted in a search of his car. Id at 538-39, 542-43. See State v. 
Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992) (requiring the totality of circumstances 
test to determine whether the officer had 'specific and articulable facts, and stating that 
"[l]ooking at each fact in isolation, as defendant does, is not proper") (citing State v. 
Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 21). cert, denied. 
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843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). See also State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 
1997) (recognizing that neither nervousness nor prior criminal record alone is sufficient to 
form reasonable suspicion, but upholding a motion to suppress partly based on officer's 
observation of the defendant's nervousness and prior criminal activity and citing cases in 
support); cf State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to give 
much weight to nervousness "[i]n the absence of other objective facts") . 
However, the principal deficiency of defendant's argument is that he relies on cases 
clearly distinguishable from this case in their lack of relevant facts demonstrating a basis 
to expand the scope of detention following a routine traffic stop. Indeed, those cases lend 
support to the reasonableness of expanding the scope of detention in this case by virtue of 
their contrasting scenarios. Thus, in Robinson, the officers detained the defendants 
following a routine traffic stop and then requested permission to search the van because 
they appeared nervous and evasive in answering questions, their story about intending to 
fish in the mountains appeared at odds with their lack of cold weather gear, and they failed 
to produce the van owner's written permission or a successful means of contacting the 
owner. Robinson. 797 P.2d at 435-36. This Court found those facts did not justify 
expanding the scope of detention to investigate a possible auto theft. Id. at 436-37. While 
noting neither the defendants' nervousness nor their lack of cold weather gear had much 
probative force, the Court was particularly impressed that the officers knew the 
defendants' papers were in order, that the van had not been reported stolen and that the 
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officers had exhausted their inquiries concerning a possible theft. IdL at 436. Moreover, it 
was plain that lack of written permission or mere failure to make successful contact with 
the owner was "insufficient to provide officers with reasonable suspicion of car theft or 
other serious crime." Id Similarly, in State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 
1992), police officers stopped a car believing the driver might be impaired, but 
immediately determined that the driver was sober. Id at 653. Thereafter, the officers 
asked to search the car because the driver was nervous, did not have a license and his 
travel route to Chicago was not the most direct. Id at 653-54. On those limited facts, this 
Court clearly found the continued detention unjustified by reasonable suspicion of more 
serious criminal conduct. Id at 655. See also State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d 155, 158-59 
(Utah App. 1992) (finding no basis to detain where, although defendant was nervous, had 
bloodshot eyes, and car was cluttered, officer failed to pursue suspicion of possible 
impairment and alcohol related offense by not giving sobriety test or asking additional 
questions). 
In each of the aforementioned cases the quantum of evidence was insufficient to 
justify reasonable suspicion of any offense suggested by the situation, and the officers 
failed to take reasonable additional measures to confirm or dispel their suspicions. See 
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 453-54 (Utah 1996) (recognizing propriety of expanding 
a detention to conduct computer check on gun if facts suggest the weapon was stolen); 
Johnson. 805 P.2d at 764 (recognizing that lack of registration and written permission to 
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use car from owner permitted further detention to inquire about registered owner, how the 
occupants came into possession, and to run a records check for a stolen vehicle). This 
case does not exhibit those deficiencies. Rather, the circumstances surrounding the stop 
depict a scenario which justified the immediately succeeding inquiry and in which each 
succeeding inquiry reasonably suggested defendant's further criminal involvement, 
thereby justifying the next inquiries made by the trooper, until there existed reasonable 
suspicion for the trooper to summon the narcotics dog. 
As the trial court concluded, Trooper Avery lawfully stopped defendant on 1-70 
because his weaving in and out of the lane, suggested possible impairment (Tr. 59-61).10 
As argued at Point II of this brief, defendant does challenge this particular basis for the 
stop, nor did he argue in the trial court that his driving pattern would not support 
reasonable suspicion of impairment, an untenable claim in any case.11 App. Br. at 32-36. 
The trooper informed defendant of the reason for the stop and then immediately requested 
defendant's license and car rental papers (Tr. 12). See State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 
659 (Utah App. 1996) (recognizing that""' an officer conducting a routine traffic stop 
may request a drivers license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and 
issue a citation'"") (citations omitted). Contemporaneously, Trooper Avery also observed 
10
 Although not specifically testified to in this case, this Court has recognized 1-70 
as a known drug trafficking route. See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 884. 
11
 Supra, n.9. 
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that defendant was unusually nervous and avoided eye contact, in contradistinction to 
other stopped drivers who got nervous only "once in a while" (Tr. 14-16).12 Noting that 
defendant's stated travel was inconsistent with both the drop off location stated in the 
rental agreement and the mileage already put on the car, the trooper became suspicious 
(Tr. 15-19). See United States v. McSwain. 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1994) ("an officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may inquire about 'identity and travel plans'") (citing 
United States v. Rivera. 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989)). The trooper's inquiries 
about defendant's travel and itinerary lasted only one or two minutes (Tr. 20). See 
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 884 (finding reasonable ten-minute detention unrelated to traffic 
stop to explore suspicion of more serious crime based only on the discrepancy between the 
defendant's travel itinerary and his stated travel plan). 
At the end of these inquiries, Trooper Avery called in for a warrants check (Tr. 21). 
See Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1133 (holding that an the officer may also check for outstanding 
12
 Defendant argues at length that nervousness is an insufficient basis to justify 
continued detention. App. Br. at 16-19. However, as noted above, this Court has 
properly recognized that nervousness, in conjunction with other relevant facts, may 
reasonably form a basis for continued detention to investigate criminal conduct beyond 
that suggested by the initial reason for the stop. Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143. Cf. State v. 
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 541 (Utah App.) (noting that while "nervous and suspicious 
behavior" may in itself be insufficient to establish probable cause, "it may . . . be 
considered in conjunction with other relevant and objective facts) (citations omitted). 
Particularly, Trooper Avery testified that defendant's conduct was unusual, distinguishing 
his behavior from that of the typical stopped driver (R. 15-17). Compare Godina-Luna, 
826 P.2d at 653 (officer admitted that "most people" shake after first being pulled over). 
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warrants during a routine traffic stop "so long as it does not significantly extend the period 
of detention"). At this point, Sergeant Bushnell, who had just completed a stop across the 
highway, turned through the median and pulled up behind Trooper Avery's patrol car (Tr. 
21). The report back from dispatch was negative, although defendant did have a record in 
New Jersey (Tr. 21-22). Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, Trooper Avery 
pursued his initial concern about defendant's possible impairment, when he immediately 
asked Sergeant Bushnell, whom he recognized as a drug recognition expert, to talk with 
defendant and see if he might be on any type of drug (Tr. 22).13 At this point defendant 
13
 In support of his claim that M[t]he impairment suspicions simply operate as a 
pretext to impermissibly extend the scope of the stop,11 see App. Br. at 28, defendant, in 
direct contradiction of the record, states:M Avery never . . . ask[ed] Bushnell to look for 
signs of impairment." App. Br. at 27. In fact, Trooper Avery testified: 
I asked Sergeant Bushnell if he'd walk up and just talk with him. He 
- - Sergeant Bushnell is a - - what they call a D.R.E., I'm sure you're aware 
of what that is, a drug recognition expert, to see if he might be on any type 
of medication, marijuana, cocaine, any type of drug. He did that. 
[Emphasis added.] 
(R. 22). Further, while it is technically accurate that "Avery did not testify that he 
suspected Fanari was impaired by drugs or alcohol," see App. Br. at 27 (emphasis added), 
it is plain that the trooper was reasonably concerned at the very outset, based on 
defendant's driving pattern, about impairment due to tiredness, that there were no signs of 
alcohol intoxication, and that it only made sense from a public safety perspective to ask a 
fortuitously available drug recognition expert to quickly determine if possible impairment 
was due to drug use, which the trooper could by that time reasonably suspected. Cf. State 
v. Ottesen. 920 P.2d at 183, 185 (Utah App. 1996) (agreeing with trial court that driver 
exhibiting signs of intoxication was reasonably detained to administer field sobriety 
tests). 
30 
had been stopped only about five minutes (Tr. 22). Trooper Avery then asked defendant if 
he had ever been in trouble before, and defendant responded that he had been arrested "for 
marijuana" in New Jersey (Tr. 24). When defendant thereafter denied that there were 
drugs in the car and refused consent to search, the trooper informed him that he was 
sending for the drug detection dog, to which defendant responded, "That's fine" (Tr. 24-
28). Fifteen minutes later the drug dog arrived and alerted on defendant's trunk (R. 32; 
Tr. 29). 
On comparable facts, this Court in State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183 (Utah App. 
1996), found that the scope of detention reasonably expanded to allow investigation of 
additional criminal activity. IdL at 185-86. In Ottesen, the driver of a car was stopped for 
following an officer's unmarked patrol car too closely. Id. at 184. The driver smelled of 
alcohol, subsequently failed field sobriety tests, and had an outstanding warrant. Id. 
Viewing the defendant, a passenger in the car, as underage, the officer asked her for 
identification, which reflected her status as a minor. Id The officer also asked her whether 
there was any alcohol in the car, whereupon the defendant handed the officer five 
unopened beer bottles. Id. This Court first found that the defendant was not unreasonably 
detained where, "[w]ithin fifteen minutes of the initial stop, the officer checked the driver's 
and defendant's identification and the vehicle's registration, ran a warrants check on the 
driver because he had no license and the officer suspected he was intoxicated, and called 
for a backup officer to perform a sobriety test." Id at 185. More importantly, on facts 
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analogous to this case, the Court also found that evidence of the driver's intoxication, 
coupled with the defendant's ownership of the car, reasonably justified expanding the 
scope of detention to inquire whether the defendant was underage and was, as a minor, 
illegally in possession of alcohol. Id 186. 
In like fashion, it was reasonable for Trooper Avery, upon discovering that there 
was evidence that defendant was under the influence of marijuana, and in light of all the 
other factors, to wit: nervousness, prior criminal history, evasiveness, improbable and 
discrepant travel plans, to then ask to search the car and proceed accordingly. See 
Humphrey. 937 P.2d at 143 (past criminal activity, nervousness, anger, and return travel 
from known drug source provided reasonable basis for detention lasting only seven or 
eight minutes before drugs uncovered). In short, evidence that defendant was under the 
influence of marijuana, in conjunction with other factors, provided a reasonable suspicion 
to further detain defendant to directly investigate the possibility of drug transport through 
further questioning and the summoning of the drug dog. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f day of August, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand delivered to D. Gilbert Athay and MichaelRjSikora, attorneys for appellant, 43 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this/P day of August, 1998. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs , 
MARCO C. FANARI, 
DOB: 02/02/69 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 961600100FS 
Judge David L. Mower 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence before the Honorable David L. 
Mower, District Court Judge, the State being represented by R. Don 
Brown, Sevier County Attorney, and the Defendant being represented by 
D. Gilbert Athay, Attorney at Law. 
The Court having considered the Defendant's Motion and having 
heard the evidence presented, now enters its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 3, 1996, at 11:00 a.m., Trooper Denis Avery of 
the Utah Highway Patrol observed a 1966 Lincoln traveling eastbound on 
Interstate 70 and noted that the vehicle was going across the fog line 
and then back across. 
J> 
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2. Trooper Avery stopped the vehicle, approached the vehicle 
and asked the driver for his driver's license and the rental papers 
inasmuch as the vehicle window indicated that it was a rental vehicle 
out of Nevada. 
3. While the documents were being located, Trooper Avery told 
the Defendant why he had been stopped and the Defendant 
acknowledged he had been weaving; however, he attributed the weaving to 
the wind. 
4. The Defendant produced a Colorado driver's license and a 
rental agreement which showed that the vehicle was rented in Las Vegas 
and was to be returned to Las Vegas. 
5. While the Defendant was looking for the registration, the 
Defendant advised that he had flown to Las Vegas and rented the vehicle 
to return to Colorado. 
6. The Defendant was uncertain as to which airline he used 
and the vehicle odometer was not consistent with the Defendant's 
statement regarding his travels. 
7. Sgt. Lance Bushnell, a drug recognition expert, came to 
the scene and advised that the Defendant demonstrated indications of 
recent drug use. 
8. A narcotics detection dog was called to the scene and 
immediately alerted on the trunk area of the vehicle. 
9. The trunk was opened and searched, revealing 255 pounds of 
marijuana. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The vehicle was lawfully stopped for investigation related 
to the traffic offense of operating a vehicle outside the designated 
lane of travel, Section 41-6-61(1), Utah Code Annotated, and possible 
driver impairment. 
2. The officer's observations and the Defendant's responses 
to questions produced reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was 
involved in criminal conduct. 
3. The search was lawfully conducted. 
O R D E R 
Having entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court denies Defendant' s Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
DATED this / N day of October, 1996. 
^ .' DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that an unsigned, full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the 3tfr^ day of 
October, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South, #325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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I hereby certify that a signed, full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-
class postage thereon fully prepaid on the /5 day of October, 
1996, addressed as follows: 
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East 400 South, #325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
